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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3593 
_____________ 
 
T.C., on behalf of Z.C., a minor child, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 2-10-cv-05229) 
District Judge:  Hon. William J. Martini 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES, and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 17, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
___________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 T.C., on behalf on her minor son Z.C., appeals the District Court‟s affirmance of 
an Administrative Law Judge‟s (“ALJ”) conclusion that Z.C. was not disabled within the 
2 
 
meaning of section 1614(a)(3)(C) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C).  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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I. 
 We write for the parties‟ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  T.C. protectively filed an application for supplemental security income on 
behalf of Z.C. on August 16, 2007, alleging disability due to a learning disability and 
asthma.
2
  He was later diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).  
Appendix (“App.”) 93.  Z.C.‟s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration on 
July 8, 2008.  Upon Z.C.‟s request, the ALJ held a hearing on November 13, 2009.  At 
the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from T.C. about Z.C.‟s ability to follow instructions 
and to focus, both at home and in school.  In addition to T.C.‟s testimony, the ALJ relied 
on medical and other non-medical evidence in the record. 
 The ALJ issued his opinion on December 10, 2009, finding that Z.C. had not been 
under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act since his application was 
filed on August 16, 2007.  Z.C. requested review by the Appeals Council, which on 
August 12, 2010 denied the request for review; thus, the ALJ‟s decision was the final 
agency decision.  T.C., on behalf of Z.C., then filed suit in District Court.  The District 
Court affirmed the ALJ‟s decision.  This appeal followed. 3  
                                                                
1
 We note with gratitude that T.C. was represented in this matter by the Child Advocacy 
Clinic at Rutgers School of Law – Newark. 
2
 The ALJ concluded that Z.C. did not have a severe impairment for asthma and T.C. does 
not challenge that conclusion on appeal.   
3
 We received a motion to supplement the record from T.C. and will deny it primarily 
because the period for which T.C. is seeking relief is 2007 to 2009, while the documents 
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 and 1383(c)(3).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the factual findings of the 
Commissioner to determine whether the administrative record contains substantial 
evidence for its findings.  Schaudeck v. Comm‟r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 
(3d Cir. 1999).  Substantial evidence means “„more than a mere scintilla‟” and is 
evidence which “„a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‟”  
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).   
 The Federal Supplemental Security Income program provides benefits to disabled 
individuals who meet certain statutory income and resource limitations.  42 U.S.C. § 
1381.  The statute provides that a child under 18 
shall be considered disabled for the purposes of this subchapter if that 
individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, 
which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be 
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 
a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i).  The Commissioner‟s regulations require a three-step 
analysis to determine whether a child is disabled:  (1) that the child is not working; (2) 
that the child had a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments; and (3) that the 
impairment, or combination of impairments, was of Listing-level severity, meaning the 
impairment(s) met, medically equaled or functionally equaled the severity of an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
with which T.C. sought to supplement the record pertain to a subsequent finding of a 
disability commencing in 2011.   
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impairment in the Listings.  20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a).  The regulations provide that 
functional equivalence to the severity of an impairment in the Listings may be 
determined based on domains of functioning.  20 C.F.R. § 416.926a.  A medically 
determinable impairment or combination of impairments functionally equals a listed 
impairment if it “result[s] in „marked‟ limitations in two domains of functioning or an 
„extreme‟ limitation in one domain.”  Id. § 416.926a(a).  A child‟s functional limitations 
are considered in terms of six domains:  “(i) Acquiring and using information; (ii) 
Attending and completing tasks; (iii) Interacting and relating with others; (iv) Moving 
about and manipulating objects; (v) Caring for yourself; and, (vi) Health and physical 
well-being.”  Id. § 416.926a(b)(1).  A limitation is “marked” when it “interferes seriously 
with your ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities” and marked 
means “more than moderate but less than extreme.”  Id. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i).   
 The ALJ found that Z.C. was not working at step one.  At step two, the ALJ found 
that Z.C. had two severe impairments:  ADHD and a learning disorder.  Administrative 
Transcript (“Tr.”) 26. 4  At step three, the ALJ found that Z.C. did not have an 
impairment or combination of impairments that met, medically equaled or functionally 
equaled one of the listed impairments.  Tr. 29.  The ALJ specifically considered whether 
Z.C.‟s ADHD met Listing 112.11 for ADHD and found that it did not.  Tr. 29.   
T.C., on behalf of Z.C., raises four issues on appeal.  We address each in turn.   
                                                                
4 T.C. submitted an appendix that she asserts contains the same documents as were 
contained in the administrative record.   T.C. Reply Br. 5 n.1.  For the sake of clarity and 
consistency, however, we cite to the certified administrative transcript filed by the 
Commissioner.   
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A. 
 T.C. argues that the District Court erred in affirming the ALJ because the ALJ 
failed to consider the effects of structured and supportive settings on the effects of Z.C.‟s 
impairments on his functioning, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b)(5).  We do not 
agree.  
 The District Court held that the ALJ “adequately considered the structured setting 
in which Z.C. had been placed along with Z.C.‟s ability to function outside of such 
settings.”  App. 21.  The District Court noted the ALJ‟s statement that he “evaluated the 
„whole child‟ in making findings regarding functional equivalent,” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 
§ 416.924a(b).  Tr. 30.  The ALJ noted “I have first evaluated how the child functions in 
all settings and at all times, as compared to other children the same age who do not have 
impairments.”  Tr. 30.  We reject T.C.‟s argument that the District Court erred in 
affirming the ALJ because the ALJ did not consider the effects of a structured setting on 
Z.C.‟s functioning and how Z.C. functioned without the structured setting because the 
District Court correctly found that the ALJ recognized that:  “(1) Z.C. had been referred 
to his school‟s resource center for assistance, (2) „had difficulty with functioning 
independently,‟ (3) had „trouble following instructions and focusing in school and at 
home,‟ (4) had been given a „full time aide to assist him in school‟ and (5) that „he is 
attending speech and occupational therapy two times per week in a self-contained special 
education classroom.‟”  App. 21 (quoting Tr. 28-30).  We hold that the District Court did 
not err in finding that the ALJ sufficiently analyzed Z.C.‟s function both inside and 
outside of a structured environment and, thus, will affirm on this ground.   
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B. 
 The ALJ examined whether Z.C. met the listing severity for ADHD, Listing 
112.11, which provides  
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Manifested by developmentally 
inappropriate degrees of inattention, impulsiveness, and hyperactivity. 
The required level of severity for these disorders is met when the 
requirements in both A and B are satisfied.  
A. Medically documented findings of all three of the following: 
1. Marked inattention; and 
2. Marked impulsiveness; and 
3. Marked hyperactivity; 
And B. . . . for children (age 3 to attainment of age 18), resulting in 
at least two of the appropriate age-group criteria in paragraph B2 of 
112.02. 
 
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 112.11.  The ALJ found that Z.C. did not 
meet Listing 112.11.   
T.C. argues that the ALJ‟s analysis amounted to a “conclusory statement . . . 
beyond meaningful judicial review.”  Burnett v. Comm‟r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 
112, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because we have no way to review the ALJ‟s hopelessly 
inadequate . . . ruling, we will vacate and remand the case for a discussion of the 
evidence and an explanation of reasoning supporting a determination that Burnett‟s 
„severe‟ impairment does not meet or is not equivalent to a listed impairment.”); see T.C. 
Reply Br. 1.  However, this Court has noted that “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use 
particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.  Rather the 
function of Burnett is to ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and 
explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.”  Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 
505 (3d Cir. 2004).  In this case, the ALJ provided a synopsis of his findings, which the 
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District Court held was sufficient for meaningful judicial review.  We agree.  Read as a 
whole, the ALJ‟s synopsis provides adequate explanation of the factors the ALJ used to 
determine whether Z.C.‟s ADHD did not meet Listing 112.11 and the ALJ‟s conclusion 
was supported by substantial evidence.   
 T.C. also argues the ALJ‟s finding that Z.C. did not functionally equal the listing 
because he had less than marked limitation or no limitation in the domains of completing 
tasks, and interacting and relating with others, was not supported by substantial evidence.  
We disagree.  As the District Court noted, the record is “rife with examples of Z.C.‟s 
ability to successfully interact with his peers and adults.”  App. 23.  Further, the ALJ 
recognized that while Z.C. had “some difficulty focusing and completing tasks . . . . [h]e 
is able to complete his work with proper focus.”  Tr. 33.  In support of this conclusion, 
the ALJ cited Exhibit 10F, which contained school records for Z.C., which the ALJ 
discussed in detail earlier in his opinion.  The ALJ also noted that the doctor from 
disability determination services (“DDS”) assessed Z.C.‟s functional domains and the 
ALJ held that the medical and non-medical record was consistent with that assessment.  
Tr. 31.  Read as a whole, the ALJ‟s conclusion that Z.C.‟s impairments did not 
functionally equal the listed impairment is supported by substantial evidence.   
C. 
 T.C. next argues that the ALJ failed to give greater weight to Z.C.‟s treating 
physicians, as provided in 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (2011) (“Generally, we give more 
weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the 
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your 
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medical impairment(s) . . . .”).5  This Court has held that “[t]reating physicians‟ reports 
should be accorded great weight, especially „when their opinions reflect expert judgment 
based on a continuing observation of the patient's condition over a prolonged period of 
time.‟”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Rocco v. Heckler, 
826 F.2d 1348, 1350 (3d Cir. 1987)).   
 The District Court properly found that the ALJ gave appropriate weight to Z.C.‟s 
treating physicians.  The ALJ noted Z.C.‟s ADHD and learning disability diagnoses.  Tr. 
31.  The ALJ discussed Dr. Nazareth‟s evaluation of Z.C., who, as the Commissioner 
notes, treated Z.C. only once.  Tr. 27-28.  The ALJ also noted Z.C.‟s assessments at the 
Family Center at Monclair, as well as assessments by teachers and school psychologists.  
Tr. 26-28.  Importantly, the ALJ noted that the medical and non-medical evidence was 
consistent with the DDS assessment of Z.C.‟s functional domains.  Tr. 31.  Thus, we 
agree that the ALJ afforded the proper weight to Z.C.‟s treating physicians and we will 
affirm on this ground.   
D. 
Finally, T.C. contends that nine pages of the fourteen pages of Exhibit 6F were 
missing from the Social Security Administration record.  T.C. contends that she brought 
the missing pages to the attention of the ALJ in her letter brief before the November 13, 
2009 hearing.  The Commissioner contends that the ALJ noted at the beginning of the 
hearing that additional documents had been submitted and were part of the record.  Tr. 
                                                                
5
 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 was amended as of March 26, 2012, so that the treating relationship 
section now appears as § 416.927(c)(2).  There was no change to the language of the 
section. 
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48.  The Commissioner, thus, argues that T.C. cannot support her conclusion that the ALJ 
did not consider the missing pages.   
However, even assuming arguendo that the ALJ did not consider the missing 
pages, we see no need to remand on this basis.  T.C. argues that the failure to include 
these pages violated Z.C.‟s right to have the record be fully and fairly developed.  
However, the Commissioner correctly argues that, even assuming the ALJ did not review 
the nine pages, they are insufficient to support remand.  To support a “new evidence” 
remand,  
the evidence must first be “new” and not merely cumulative of what is 
already in the record.  Second, the evidence must be “material;” it must be 
relevant and probative.  Beyond that, the materiality standard requires that 
there be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed 
the outcome of the Secretary‟s determination . . . . Finally the claimant 
must demonstrate good cause for not having incorporated the new evidence 
into the administrative record. 
 
Szubak v. Sec‟y of Health & Human Servs., 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations 
omitted).  
Exhibit 6F contains records from the Family Center at Monclair.  The first five 
missing pages contain drug information for Adderall.  App. 561-65.  The next missing 
page is an undated Medication Information Form, noting that Z.C. was prescribed 15 mg 
of Adderall.  App. 566.  One page from the exhibit is unreadable.  App. 568.  The last 
missing page is another Medication Information Form dated March 20, 2008, prescribing 
18 mg of Concerta.  The Commissioner notes that a May 2008 prescription for Concerta 
was already in the record.  Tr. 271.  The only page that might be considered material is a 
psychiatric evaluation form for Z.C. in which the doctor described Z.C. in the exam as 
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“constantly running around.”  App. 567.  However, the Commissioner correctly notes that 
this fact is consistent with other facts in the record, namely the referral to the Family 
Center was for hyperactivity and Z.C. showed heightened activity in another examination 
in the record.  Tr. 265, 343.  Because the missing pages were not new and were not 
material, we need not remand for the ALJ to consider them, if, in fact, he did not.   
III. 
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
